Economics textbooks are full of clever-and-appealing policy proposals. Proposals like: “Let’s redistribute money to the desperately poor” and “Let’s tax goods with negative externalities.” They’re so clever and so appealing that it’s hard to understand how any smart, well-meaning person could demur. When critics appeal to “public choice problems,” it’s tempting to tell the critics that they’re the problem. The political system isn’t that dysfunctional, is it? In any case, reflexively whining, “The political system will muck up your clever, appealing policy proposal,” hardly makes that system work better. The naysayers should become part of the solution: Endorse the clever-and-appealing policy proposals – and strive to bring them to life.
When you look at the real world, though, you see something strange: Almost no one actually pushes for the textbooks’ clever-and-appealing policy proposals. Instead, the people inspired by the textbooks routinely attach themselves to trendy-but-awful policy proposals. If you point out the discrepancy, they’re often too annoyed to respond. When they do, reformers shrug and say: “The clever-and-appealing policy never has – and probably never will – have much political support. So we have to do this instead.”
Examples? You start off by advocating high-impact redistribution to help poor children and the severely disabled… and end defending the ludicrously expensive and wasteful Social Security program. “Unfortunately, the only politically viable way to help the poor is to help everyone.” Or you start off advocating Pigovian taxes to clean the air, and end up defending phone books of picayune environmental regulations. “Unfortunately, this is the way pollution policy actually works.”
Don’t believe me? Here’s a brand-new example courtesy of Paul Krugman:
But if a nation in flames isn’t enough to produce a consensus for action — if it isn’t even enough to produce some moderation in the anti-environmentalist position — what will? The Australia experience suggests that climate denial will persist come hell or high water — that is, through devastating heat waves and catastrophic storm surges alike…
[…]
But if climate denial and opposition to action are immovable even in the face of obvious catastrophe, what hope is there for avoiding the apocalypse? Let’s be honest with ourselves: Things are looking pretty grim. However, giving up is not an option. What’s the path forward?
The answer, pretty clearly, is that scientific persuasion is running into sharply diminishing returns. Very few of the people still denying the reality of climate change or at least opposing doing anything about it will be moved by further accumulation of evidence, or even by a proliferation of new disasters. Any action that does take place will have to do so in the face of intractable right-wing opposition.
This means, in turn, that climate action will have to offer immediate benefits to large numbers of voters, because policies that seem to require widespread sacrifice — such as policies that rely mainly on carbon taxes — would be viable only with the kind of political consensus we clearly aren’t going to get.
What might an effective political strategy look like? … [O]ne way to get past the political impasse on climate might be via “an emphasis on huge infrastructural projects that created jobs” — in other words, a Green New Deal. Such a strategy could give birth to a “large climate-industrial complex,” which would actually be a good thing in terms of political sustainability.
Notice the pattern.
Step 1: Economics textbooks offer a clever-and-appealing policy proposal: Let’s tax carbon emissions to curtail the serious negative externalities of fossil fuels. It’s cheap, it’s effective, it provides great static and dynamic incentives. Public choice problems? Don’t listen to those naysayers.
Step 2: Argh, Pigovian taxes are going nowhere.
Step 3: Let’s have a trendy-but-awful populist infrastructure program to get the masses on board.
So what? For starters, any smart activist who reaches Step 3 tacitly concedes that public choice problems are dire. You offer the public a clever-and-appealing remedy for a serious social ill, and democracy yawns. To get action, you have to forget about cost or cost-effectiveness – and just try to drug the public with demagoguery.
Note: I’m not attacking Krugman for having little faith in democracy. His underlying lack of faith in democracy is fully justified. I only wish that Krugman would loudly embrace the public choice framework that intellectually justifies his lack of faith. (Or better yet, Krugman could loudly embraced my psychologically-enriched public choice expansion pack).
Once you pay proper respect to public choice theory, however, you cannot simply continue on your merry way. You have to ponder its central normative lesson: Don’t advocate government action merely because a clever-and-appealing policy proposal passes a cost-benefit test. Instead, look at the trendy-but-awful policies that will actually be adopted – and see if they pass a cost-benefit test. If they don’t, you should advocate laissez-faire despite all those shiny ideas in the textbook.
Krugman could naturally reply, “I’ve done the math. Global warming is so terrible that trendy-but-awful policies are our least-bad bet.” To the best of my knowledge, though, this contradicts mainstream estimates of the costs of warming. That aside, why back a Green New Deal instead of deregulation of nuclear power or geoengineering? If recalcitrant public opinion thwarts your clever-and-appealing remedy, maybe you started out on the wrong path in the first place.
Unfair? Well, this is hardly the first time that Krugman has rationalized destructive populism when he really should have reconsidered. Krugman knows that immigration is the world’s fastest way to escape absolute poverty. He knows that standard complaints about immigration are, at best, exaggerated. But he’s still an immigration skeptic, because:
The New Deal made America a vastly better place, yet it probably wouldn’t have been possible without the immigration restrictions that went into effect after World War I. For one thing, absent those restrictions, there would have been many claims, justified or not, about people flocking to America to take advantage of welfare programs.
Notice the pattern.
Step 1: You start with the textbook case for a welfare state to alleviate domestic poverty. Public choice problems? Bah.
Step 2: Next, you decide that you can’t get that welfare state without horrible collateral damage.
Step 3: So you casually embrace the status quo, without seriously engaging obvious questions, like: “Given political constraints, perhaps its actually better not to have the New Deal?” or even “How close can we get to the New Deal without limiting immigration?”
The moral: If the only way you can get your great idea implemented is to mutilate it and/or package it with a pile of expensive junk, you really should wonder, “Is it still worth it?”
Well, is it?
READER COMMENTS
KevinDC
Jan 23 2020 at 11:22am
Like many things, this reminds me of something Scott Alexander wrote, when he was critiquing an argument in favor of government intervention in food. He recaps the standard textbook economics argument about how taxing unhealthy foods and subsidizing healthy foods would do a lot to solve the issues people are worried about. Then he pivots:
Full post here: https://slatestarcodex.com/2017/11/21/contra-robinson-on-public-food/
Jon Murphy
Jan 23 2020 at 11:48am
In fairness to Krugman, he does do this from time to time. For example, in his trade book with Melitz and Obstfeld he goes into length discussing the public choice issues with optimal tariff policy, ultimately concluding that it is a neat theoretical quirk but not applicable in real life. He reiterates this point in several columns (see, for example, his April 22, 2018, NYT column “Steel Tariffs and Wages”). I will admit he is not consistent in his thinking, however.
nobody.really
Jan 23 2020 at 1:20pm
Caplan makes some fair points–but I think stumbles here:
Huh?
The linked article provides no discussion of nuclear deregulation. To the contrary, it notes that nuclear generators, like coal generators, are collapsing because they’re TOO DAMNED EXPENSIVE compared to gas-powered generators and renewable sources of energy (especially wind), while total demand for electricity is DECLINING. Specifically, the article says –
“Until carbon pricing is in place, or natural gas prices rise significantly, owners of economically vulnerable nuclear plants will continue asking policymakers for financial assistance. Policymakers facing this situation should consider … providing financial support for power plants with strong safety records….
[The Union of Concerned Scientists USA] recommendations include better enforcement of existing regulations, expedited transfer of nuclear waste into dry casks, strengthened reactor security requirements, and higher safety standards for new plants. We advocate the continued prohibition of reprocessing and a ban on the use of plutonium-based fuels. We also support continued research and development of nuclear power technologies….”
It is market forces, not regulation, that has hamstrung the nuclear industry. The Obama Administration authorized the construction of four new nuclear generators. After completing 40% of their two projects, South Carolina Electric & Gas and Santee Cooper threw in the towel in 2017—in part because Trump killed the Clean Power Plan that provided the economic justification for the plants. Not to worry, though; these two utilities are able to recover their sunk costs from their ratepayers.
Meanwhile, the two Vogtle generators in Georgia, initially planned to become operational in 2016 and 2017 at a cost of $17 billion, are still not complete and are now projected to cost $25 billion (with $12 billion in federal loan guarantees).
What would deregulating nuclear power mean? Would it mean eliminating federal loan guarantees? Ratepayer guarantees? Would it mean eliminating the socialization of the industry’s liabilities under the Price-Anderson Act, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage?
We may well want nuclear generators as a substitute for other generators–but retaining and promoting them will require enormous government intervention, not withdrawal.
Mark Z
Jan 23 2020 at 3:36pm
I think the main point is: for a given level of subsidization, less nuclear regulation means more nuclear power. Even if one accepts that subsidies are necessary, that doesn’t justify “more government intervention” in the form of regulation at all. Regulation not only is not a substitute for a subsidy, but has more or less the opposite effect.
The quote from the Union of Concerned Scientists is somewhat ironic in this context though; on the one hand, they say nuclear energy is too expensive without subsides; then in the next breath, defend regulations that are a major reason why it’s so expensive. The UCS is generally fairly critical of nuclear power, and their policy prescription suggests they want less of it (or at least not much more of it). I think they’re wrong, and that nuclear power is actually very much overregulated compared to pretty much any other means of energy generation. We already require it to be far safer than other types of energy production. If the current amount of harm posed by other sources is acceptable, then we should deregulate nuclear to bring it down to their level and allow it to be more competitive.
Another thing: much of the cost of nuclear is due to the insurance requirements on nuclear energy production. It’s often argued that nuclear energy producers need subsidies to pay for said insurance, but then it’s the state that requires them to be so insured. I suspect current requirements force nuclear plants to be over-insured; again, treating it as if it’s much more dangerous compared to other kinds of energy production than it really is. In which case, we could reduce the costs by easing the insurance requirements.
Christophe Biocca
Jan 23 2020 at 4:05pm
I’d argue the US has just had (some) deregulation in the last decade (leading to the first reactor starts in 3 decades), in the form of type-licensing and combined construction and operating licenses.
Yes most of those reactor starts were cancelled (with the companies effectively sitting on a 20-year build-a-reactor call option), but that’s mostly due to a large and unforeseen drop in natural gas prices.
Kevin Dick
Jan 23 2020 at 1:58pm
I’m going to have to bookmark this for the next time I’m discussing policy with someone who pulls this maneuver. Much more constructive than turning red and sputtering.
Mark Z
Jan 23 2020 at 3:23pm
I’d speculate that almost no one actually reasons the way you’re suggesting, and that (as I think is obvious in the case of Krugman) this pattern is just people groping for any excuse they can come up with for always siding with ‘their side’ on every policy no matter what. It’s pure tribalism, and I think it over-esteems it to impute some sort of rational strategy to it. Nonetheless, if we pretend this is how people who defend bad policies on their side really think, it seems clear to me that it should almost always lead them to the opposite conclusion.
Here, obviously, a Pigovian carbon tax is far more popular on the right than the Green New Deal is. If the left got behind a carbon tax, it would be far easier to pass than a GND. The main impediment to a carbon tax specifically is not from the right (if this line of reasoning is correct) but from the left, whose intransigence in support of the GND is what prevents a Pigovian carbon tax from happening, despite the latter having more cross-party appeal. Krugman is actually tacitly conceding (whether it’s true or not) that the right is less intransigent about climate policy than the left; after all, he things a GND will (I suppose by doling out enough free stuff) cajole enough people on the right into supporting it that it will survive as a policy; but that a carbon tax could not appeal enough to the left to be a viable policy despite being a less partisan policy.
If Krugman really believes this, his allocation of blame is unjustified, and the left deserves its share for making relatively sensible, efficient environmental policy impossible by stubbornly sticking to their preferred terrible policy idea. If Krugman doesn’t believe this – if he thinks people on the left really do care about the environment and would be more willing to compromise on their policy (the GND) than the right, then the logical course is the exact opposite of what Krugman claims. The best use of his time is not indulging the currently in vogue, abysmal policy idea that has no cross-party appeal , but rather the best use would be to try to convince leftists to embrace a carbon tax as the best environmental policy at the margin.
I can’t help but contrast Krugman unfavorably with Greg Mankiw, who has instead sought to use his time more efficiently to convince influential people on ‘his side’ of what he believes is the correct policy response, and also is willing to hold ‘his side’ accountable for what he sees as policy failures on its part. People who take Krugman’s path, on the other hand, and just fall in line behind what they know are bad ideas, are a major reason why almost exclusively bad policy ideas with no hope for broad appeal seem to come out of the environmentalist left. This unquestioning acquiescence Krugman is encouraging is politically self-defeating, and I imagine even he likely knows this to be true.
Weir
Jan 23 2020 at 9:09pm
A nation in flames isn’t enough to produce a consensus for action. Krugman himself is good proof of that. Nuclear power would count as action in a fashion. Attenuated and roundabout compared to firebreaks. Reducing the fuel load. Controlled burning every winter, clearing out the undergrowth, managing forests instead of the current hands-off policy that makes fires worse.
But effective solutions are off the table. The pro-environmentalist position, as Krugman would call it, is to make devastating and uncontrollable fires inevitable and then, inevitably, to deny all responsibility for the predictable result.
Government policy is to not act to prevent the fuel load piling up. For fifty thousand years aborigines with firesticks kept the forest floor looking like an English gentleman’s park. Those were the words used by one European immigrant after another, startled by the lack of undergrowth when they wandered into the Australian bush. But that was in the Age of Enlightenment. Now, in our less enlightened age, government officials let the woods run wild, wilder than when indigenous Aussies were still in charge. It takes chutzpah to blame the populace. A lot of us outsiders with no control over policy do know the history, before the new superstitions took a death-grip hold on campus, in government, and the media. Firestick farming by aborigines kept the fuel load down.
Policy is to prevent people from taking any action to clear out the deadwood and to manage the forests to prevent fires running wild. Controlled burning isn’t clever. It simply works. And a clear track through the trees looks unsightly to romantic eyes. There are people who won’t tolerate any preventative intrusion into the “pristine wilderness” of Australia (proving that they don’t see aborigines as human) and the predictable consequence is just one more occasion for grandstanding.
But that’s been a disaster for the environment thus far, in this specific example. Next year’s fires aren’t going to become any less destructive if people pay a 50% or 100% tariff on energy. The fires in fifty years aren’t going to be prevented by tax hikes on drivers and everyone who uses electric light. The real action is on the ground. How many more fires will it take to come back to reality? At what point would tax hikes cease to be the solution to everything?
Alexander Turok
Jan 23 2020 at 9:41pm
Bryan, should we means test the child tax credit? Or how about means-testing the standard deduction? In these cases I think it’s obvious that “means testing” is just another way of saying taxes going up on the group above the line. “Means testing” social security is just another way of saying increasing taxes on people above the line. Doing it at more than the billionaire level would provide horrible incentives, as nobody would save for retirement(or at least assure that such savings are legally in the hands of their children) knowing that they would be punished for having done so.
Thaomas
Jan 24 2020 at 8:16am
I did not see any evidence in the link that SS is costly as opposed to defended with bad arguments. True, it would be slightly less costly (induce bad behavior) if it were funded by a consumption tax, but where is the cost of SS? Do people really work less because of the wage tax or stop working sometime after 65 because SS is so generous that, “why bother?”
robc
Jan 24 2020 at 8:36am
I think it is costly because it reduces my income by roughly 15.3%
Vivian Darkbloom
Jan 24 2020 at 9:57am
Social security benefits are not “income”? Does your 401(k) contribution also reduce your “income” dollar for dollar and is therefore “costly”? Depending on your circumstances, social security can be a good investment or a bad one; but, over your lifetime I doubt very much that it reduces your income by 15.3 percent.
robc
Jan 24 2020 at 12:20pm
FICA is a tax.
SS payments are a transfer payment.
There is not connection (legally) between them. Sure, there is a formula, but that is just BS. Their is no ownership.
If they wanted to change the law and make SS a mandatory 12.4% (I will separate out Medicare) deposit into an MIRA (Mandatory IRA) program, I would be less opposed to it.
But right now it is a tax that may or many not result in me receiving some or all of it back.
If I die before I collect any, it goes away, at least my 401k will still go to my heirs.
Thaomas
Jan 24 2020 at 4:38pm
That FICA is a tax and that the benefits are transfer payments does not address the issue of what the cost of the program is. How much does the program reduce real GDP by inducing some sub-optimal behavior: not working to earn taxed wages or earning, “retiring” “too soon,” or whatever you identify? (That FICA taxes wages instead of consumption, does imply probably some tax on savings and so somewhat more costly than necessary, but how much?)
robc
Jan 24 2020 at 6:11pm
I dont care about cost to gdp, I care about cost to me. I am not a utilitarian and I earned the money, so the cost to me is all that matters to me.
Vivian Darkbloom
Jan 25 2020 at 3:56am
robc,
You are wrong on a couple of levels. First, while Congress may change the law with respect to your expected social security benefits, that doesn’t change the fact that your expected benefits have a current value. An economist would discount the expected future benefit by any risk that your future benefits may be eliminated or reduced (or increased!). The analysis would also account for the fact that half of those contributions (paid by the employer) are pre-tax and either 50 percent or 85 percent of future contributions, under current law, are tax exempt.
Second, your quibble about social security contributions being a “tax” or a “premium’ is irrelevant. Your expected future benefits are benefits nonetheless in a cost-benefit analysis. Also, if I may quibble a bit here, what is your source that these contributions are simply “taxes”? Are they deductible or creditable against other taxes? The closest the IRS has come to defining compulsory social security contributions is in the foreign realm. Generally, the US grants a foreign *tax* credit for foreign *taxes* paid with respect to foreign source income (alternatively, at the election of the taxpayer, such taxes are deductible as itemized deductions). The federal income tax code and the related regulations do not allow a foreign tax credit for equivalent foreign contributions to social security schemes precisely because there is an economic benefit associated with those contributions and hence they are not “taxes”.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/26/1.901-2
robc
Jan 25 2020 at 7:39pm
Fleming v Nestor
Thaomas
Jan 24 2020 at 8:22am
How does public choice theory refute, say, taxing externalities any more that command and control policies? If a revenue neutral carbon tax is likely to be sullied in the process of legislating and administering it, wouldn’t the same and worse happen to a Green New Deal?
Nick R
Jan 26 2020 at 9:11pm
Thaomas, the point is, if you want to tax activity that produces an externality, you get a tax for the activity… but an exemption for this deserving industry over here… and for this other one over there… and of course, for my deserving brother-in-law’s business too, after all, it’s so small it wouldn’t make a difference in the scheme of things, etc. With the Green New Deal, you don’t even get a pretense of a rational policy of taxing undesirable activity, you just get a wholesale control of industry after industry, by a political class that only has our own welfare at heart, and, if they do say so themselves, that of the entire earth. So trust them.
Thaomas
Jan 24 2020 at 11:22am
Theoretically one would expect growth-oriented, market friendly people to prefer a revenue neutral tax on net CO2 emissions to a GND. Probably they do. But I don’t here that argument. Rather it’s just what’s wrong with the GND including that the harm from CO2 accumulation in the atmosphere is “exaggerated” and that It’s likely that a revenue neutral tax on net CO2 emissions would come out not being a perfectly revenue neutral tax on net CO2 emissions because of “public choice” problems. Conclusion: do nothing and wait for something like the GND to actually come along and then say “I told you so.”
Warren Platts
Jan 24 2020 at 6:30pm
Look, if you want the USA to lower its share of global CO2 emissions, the single, most cost-effective government policy would be import tariffs on goods.
The CO2 embodied in the goods imports to the United States compared to the CO2 we would produce if those products were produced domestically represents a huge atmospheric input. I think Dave Koch himself said that fertilizer he imported from China contained 5X the CO2 of the identical fertilizer he produced withing the USA. Dan Dimicco has told me that Chinese steel embodies a similar multiple of CO2 produced per ton of American steel. If we were able to reshore all production we consume that was produced in China, the global carbon savingsw would be equivalent all the renewables we have built up the last 20 years to all the carbon savings we have made by switching from coal to fracked natural gas.
Jon Murphy
Jan 27 2020 at 9:04am
Prima facie, that doesn’t seem likely. Imports are such a small portion of the US economy (around 15% of GDP). Even if we assert that foreign manufacturing is more CO2 intensive than domestic (which is really too broad a statement to make), it seems to me that a tariff would not really affect things too much.
Furthermore, given the fact that even the moderate tariffs under Trump are not cost-effective, it’s hard to see how increasing them will be. Remember thy cost-benefit analysis!
Mark Z
Jan 25 2020 at 4:12am
If your argument is, “even if you oppose a carbon tax, you should publicly support it, because some kind of anti-carbon emission policy is going to happen in any case, so you may as well push things toward the least bad option,” this isn’t what Krugman is arguing. In fact he’s kind of arguing the opposite: precisely because climate change policy is not inevitable, and because believes any climate change policy better than no policy, even if you support a carbon tax, you shouldn’t do so publicly but should instead publicly support the GND because it’s more likely to be realized.
Since I think neither of these are true, and that some climate change policy isn’t inevitable and a carbon tax is more politically viable than a GND, I’d say people should publicly support what they privately support, which has the advantage of being simple. If anything though, GND supporters should be quieter about it and instead publicly support a carbon tax, both because it’s more politically plausible and because the GND probably makes climate change policy in general less likely.
I will concede that I think people who oppose any emissions reduction policy should nonetheless contribute to the discussion of what the optimal policy should be on the condition that some kind of policy to reduce emissions must happen. In general I think people should think more about conditional policy optima; it keeps discourse from getting too insular imo.
Brett
Jan 26 2020 at 5:22pm
That’s what supporters of universal programs do. Free college advocates, for example, know that some of the beneficiaries will be students from families who could have otherwise paid out of pocket – but they consider that an acceptable trade-off for the programs benefits, and think making it universal will make it more likely to become policy (not to mention that if progressive taxation is used to pay for it, those who could have otherwise afforded will be paying more for it – just not directly).
. . . Besides, you can always take aim at paring off some of the crap later. Policy regulations are not set in stone, certainly not in a democracy.
Jon Murphy
Jan 27 2020 at 10:45am
“Nothing is so permanent as a temporary government program.” -Milton Friedman
It is quite difficult to remove, or even alter, government programs. The folks who are harmed by the change will fight tooth and nail to keep their benefits.
Jacob
Jan 27 2020 at 11:26am
At least part of the disconnect is your presumed “mainstream” estimate of damages from climate change. There is significant disagreement within the economics literature on this point, so estimates an order of magnitude higher than Nordhaus’s might also be considered “mainstream.”
Jens
Jan 28 2020 at 5:44am
Fortunately someone mentioned it. I don’t know how many tweets, blogs, and comments I read over the past year from meteorologists, physicists and mathematicians who joked about Nordhaus’ damage function in particular and the whole approach in general. Some have replaced it with some other type of function that also goes through the existing data points and which would ultimately mean that we will have no GDP at all in 50 years. It doesn’t even matter if they heard of Weitzman or not. Well, they’re not economists, they’re scientists. Why should you go to a doctor when you are sick?
If we knew today that a large asteroid will strike tomorrow or that the radiation front of a supernova 3 or 4 light years away will hit us tomorrow, it is very questionable whether GDP estimates based on experience of the past 50 to 100 years could provide any enlightening insights. Especially when they have to be corrected as often as the DICE model. (It is fair to say that the article linked in the blog above mentions these shortcomings). You can push a cup of tea around on the table, and if aren’t careful there will be some (negative) spill overs. But if you push the cups balance point over the edge of the table, the cup is broken and the floor is wet. No more use avoiding spill-overs.
Of course there are differences between asteroid, supernova and the climate change accelerated by human economy. Differences in terms of time periods, damage development and opportunity costs. But the questions that should actually be discussed are: How big are these differences? How likely are they? And to what extent can one actually derive the argument from this that political inaction is the least risk or the most rational decision.
If the answers to these questions are given, especially the last one, and/or if the answer is the premise, not the conclusion, then you should not hope too much from the resulting text clouds.
Jon Murphy
Jan 28 2020 at 11:02am
Economics still has a roll to play here. Economists cannot say whether or not global warming is due to humanity or not or the accuracy of the models or not (aside from broad statistical claims), but as you say, that is not our job. Where we can contribute is considering how various policies will affect people’s incentives, how they may react, and to help keep things in perspective.
For example, you state that there are some models that show “we will have no GDP at all in 50 years.” What this means is that humanity ceases to exist in 50 years. In which case, we ask the question: “what is best to be done about this?” If humanity is truly doomed, is it best to simply do nothing and live our best lives between then and now? How much should one be willing to spend to prevent extinction? Would the changes needed to stave off disaster be worth taking? We can, and should be, in the conversation about cost-benefit analysis.
In other words, Nordhaus’ point doesn’t change at all just because the numbers change.
Economics has long been called this dismal science because we tend to be the optimists in the room. We tend to rain on people’s pity parades. Countless economists have laughed off dire apocalyptic predictions because of economic reasoning (see, for example, the famous bet between Julian Simon and Paul Ehrlich). Economics, done right, emphasizes human ingenuity, something science doesn’t always do.
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