Within the economics community, thrift was very fashionable during the neoliberal era (roughly 1980-2007). During the 2010s, economists opened a three front war on thrift. Thrift was blamed for rising inequality, stagnating aggregate demand, and debt problems associated with “currency manipulation”. In each case, the charges were false. Let’s consider them one at a time.
The most famous recent critique of inequality was Thomas Piketty’s book Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Piketty claimed that the forces of capitalism inevitably led to greater wealth inequality unless restrained in some fashion. He focused on the following inequality:
r > g
This means that the annual rate of return on capital assets usually exceeds the growth rate in the economy. You might argue that the recent risk free interest rate is lower than the trend rate of economic growth, but Piketty pointed out that returns on assets such as stocks and real estate have often exceeded the growth rate of the economy. As a result, wealth will accumulate at a pace that exceeds the growth in GDP, producing increasing wealth inequality.
For this theory to work, one needs to assume that the wealthy do not consume the returns on their capital. This is where thrift becomes the villain in the story. The greater the degree of thrift, the greater the growth in wealth inequality.
In my view, what matters is not wealth inequality, rather it is economic inequality; i.e. inequality in consumption. To the extent that I worry about economic inequality, I worry more about wealthy people with high levels of consumption (such as Larry Ellison) and less about wealthy individuals with low levels of consumption (such as Warren Buffett.) Saving by the ultra-wealthy might make wealth more unequal, but it makes consumption more equal.
The second front on the war on thrift opened in the 2010s, when a long period of near zero interest rates led to worry about monetary policy impotence. The root cause of the problem was believed to be the “paradox of thrift”—attempts to save more led to near zero interest rates and falling aggregate demand. Economists such as Krugman, Woodford, Eggertsson, and Summers worried that monetary policy would be ineffective at zero interest rates. Saving is contractionary in that sort of world, and fiscal deficits are needed in order to provide an adequate level of aggregate demand.
Long time readers know that I don’t buy this claim; monetary policy remains highly effective at near zero interest rates. If the world’s major central banks don’t know how to boost nominal spending, I’d be glad to show them.
The third front in the war on thrift emerged in the arena of international economics. Thrift in places like East Asia (especially China) and Northern Europe (especially Germany) were seen as leading to large current account surpluses, which somehow imposed harm on deficit countries.
One claim is that the current account surpluses had the effect of depressing global aggregate demand. But in that case, deficit countries could easily offset the effects with more expansionary monetary policies. Indeed this is exactly what the US did from 1985-2007. By 2007, our trade deficit had reached extremely high levels, but appropriate monetary policy kept unemployment low.
Another complaint was that these surpluses forced excessive borrowing on deficit countries such as Greece. But no one is forced to borrow. For instance, Australia kept its budget deficits at very low levels for decades, despite large and persistent current account deficits. Greece’s excessive public borrowing was an unfortunate policy decision, not something forced on Greece by German surpluses. Not all countries can have current account surpluses at the same time, but it’s possible for all countries to have budget surpluses at the same time.
I am a big fan of thrift, but at the moment my side is losing the battle. The US government is running up debts like a drunken sailor. All the energy in the economics profession is with the anti-thrift factions.
Someday the tide will turn and thrift will come back in style. Practices that are virtuous at the individual level are rarely harmful at the country level. Eventually it will be recognized that the thriftier nations tend to be the more successful nations.
READER COMMENTS
David Henderson
Aug 6 2020 at 7:45pm
You write:
And I think it was Ronald Reagan in his 1984 acceptance speech for the Republican nomination in Dallas who said something similar about the Democrats’ plans (and not accepting responsibility for his own role), who followed up by saying:
Thomas Hutcheson
Aug 8 2020 at 9:28am
And whose money is the US government spending?
Then there is the inherent imprecision of complaining about “deficits” (even deficits during periods of less than full employment). The complaint should rather be directed that the combination of taxes, expenditures, and transfers rather than an innocent 🙂 arithmetic difference between them. That said, I agree with Keynes that at full employment surpluses are probably a good rule of thumb.
Jens
Aug 7 2020 at 4:06am
Thrift is virtue, avarice is sin.
Michael Pettengill
Aug 7 2020 at 8:12am
I believe in thrift: zero economic profits.
Ie, given current interest rates, returns on depreciated labor cost of capital should be no higher than 4% for high risk investments.
Any asset returning more demands building more assets, by paying workers, to drive down economic rents/profits. As Keynes prescribes.
Matthias Goergens
Aug 9 2020 at 3:31am
Your argument would only be applicable to low risk assets.
There’s no limit to how much risk you can take, and such how much the riskiest assets ‘should’ return.
(Or rather, your argument doesn’t put any limit on risk aversion. The higher the average person’s risk aversion, the higher a return risky investments have to pay.)
David O'Rear
Aug 7 2020 at 11:34am
Hmm, 1980-2007 “thrift” ?
The budget deficit in 1993 was 1.3 percentage points worse than in 1981; 4.9 points better eight years later (2001), 11 points worse eight years after that (2009), 6.9 points better eight years later (2017), and 1.7 points worse last year than in 2017.
The only real pattern I see is the change in which party held the White House.
Scott Sumner
Aug 8 2020 at 2:17pm
I never said 1980-2007 was a period of thrift, I said it was a period where economists favored thrift. Those are completely different claims.
Thomas Hutcheson
Aug 7 2020 at 1:17pm
All three ideas are partly wrong, but for different reasons.
Pinkety is wrong because he does not consider the possibility of redistribution of assets or income from those assets.
Krugman was wrong because he assumed that the Fed could not buy enough stuff to keep NGDP rising at a constant rate, when the real problem was that it would not (just as it has refused to do in 2020).
The third is wrong because a trade deficit/strong dolare is not a problem in itself. It might be thought of as a deficit of savings (say because of a structural federal deficit or perhaps stemming from the belief that the capital inflow was not being invested in activities with rates of return in excess of the returns paid on the capital.
Matthias Goergens
Aug 9 2020 at 3:32am
Piketty was even more wrong, because he didn’t differentiate between land and capital.
George Carty
Aug 17 2020 at 3:19am
“For instance, Australia kept its budget deficits at very low levels for decades, despite large and persistent current account deficits.”
The only way a country can run a big current account deficit without running a big budget deficit (the UK during Tony Blair’s prime ministership would be another example) would be if that country’s private sector were becoming ever-more indebted: usually this means that households are spending lots on imported consumer goods and paying for them by borrowing against the rising prices of assets (usually real estate).
This is not sustainable.
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